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affixed German swastikas to the fuselage,
and sent the plane to Germany.
At first, the Germans were suspicious of Monti. They soon decided, however, that he was the “real deal.” In
November 1944, they enrolled him as an
SS-Untersturmführer (second lieutenant)
in SS-Standarte Kurt Eggers, a Waffen-SS
propaganda unit.
Monti began broadcasting Englishlanguage propaganda on the radio. He
tried to persuade GIs listening to his
broadcasts “all over the European theater” that Americans should be fighting
with Germany against the Soviet Union,
as Communist Russia was the “true enemy of world peace.”
In April 1945, with defeat imminent
and Germany needing all its assets on the
front lines, SS-Untersturmführer Monti
was ordered to join a combat unit in
northern Italy. A month later, Monti surrendered to the U.S. Fifth Army in Milan.
In the weeks that followed, Monti was
interrogated by a series of Army intelligence agents. He freely admitted that he
had left his unit in Karachi but claimed
that “he had done so in order to wage
a one-man war against the Germans.”
Monti also admitted that he had wrongfully appropriated the airplane in Naples,
but only to take the fight to the Luftwaffe.
As for the Waffen-SS uniform that he was
wearing when he surrendered, Monti
explained that he had been shot down
and taken prisoner by the Germans. He
claimed to have been in German prisonerof-war camps until he managed to escape.
He then received help from Italian partisans, who dressed him in a German uniform so that he could more easily travel
through Axis-held territory and return
to Allied lines.
The Army did not buy his imaginative
cover story and, in May 1945, charged
him with desertion and with “wrongfully,
knowingly and willfully” misappropriating “one P-38 aircraft.” A few months
later, he was tried and convicted by a
general court-martial in Naples. Monti

returned to American soil and was serving time in an Army prison in New York
when the Army offered him the chance
to get out of jail if he would reenlist as a
private. No doubt realizing that rejoining
the Army was preferable to finishing his
long jail sentence, Monti returned to the
ranks in February 1946. Two years later,
Monti was wearing sergeant’s stripes.
Meanwhile, Army intelligence operatives were going through thousands and
thousands of pages of captured German
documents. Soon, these men discovered
references to SS-Untersturmführer Monti
and his activities while in the Waffen-SS.
With this evidence in hand, the Department
of Justice moved quickly, and in October
1948, Sergeant Monti was indicted by a
federal grand jury in the Eastern District
of New York for the crime of treason; the
indictment alleged 21 overt acts.
In January 1949, Monti appeared in the
U.S. district court in Brooklyn, New York.
He had previously entered a not-guilty
plea to the crime. Now, standing before
Chief Judge Robert A. Inch, Monti withdrew this plea and informed the judge
that he desired to plead guilty.
The U.S. Constitution states that “No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses
to the same overt Act, or on Confession
in open Court.” Mindful of this requirement, Monti was advised of his rights,
was sworn, took the stand, and confessed
in open court that he had voluntarily
performed acts constituting the crime of
treason, including the various overt acts
alleged in the indictment. Chief Judge
Inch found Monti guilty and sentenced
him to 25 years in jail and a $10,000 fine.
Why did Monti withdraw his notguilty plea? Why did he not demand trial
on the merits? It seems that Monti’s attorneys believed that if they went to trial, their client would likely be sentenced
to death, or at least life imprisonment,
given the facts and circumstances of the
treason and the aggravating factor that
Monti had been an Army officer. As a

result, Monti’s two defense counsel told
him that he should plead guilty and throw
himself on the mercy of the court. This
would avoid death or life imprisonment,
and while Monti could expect a “severe”
sentence, it would not be more than 30
years. When Chief Judge Inch sentenced
Monti to 25 years in jail, Monti should
have understood that he had received
good legal advice.
Monti served his sentence at the U.S.
Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. He
was paroled from Leavenworth in 1960,
after serving 11 years of his sentence. He
resettled in his home state of Missouri and
died there in 2000. He was 78 years old.
The court-martial of Lieutenant Monti,
his restoration to active duty, and his subsequent treason trial in U.S. district court
are a unique set of events in legal history.
Certainly, his trial in federal court stands
out as probably the only American treason case involving a confession—the single exception to the two-witness rule in
treason cases. q
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In Ferster v. Ferster, [2016] EWCA (Civ)
717, three disputatious brothers owned an
English Internet gaming company. Two
teamed up to cause the company to sue
the third, Jonathan, for breach of fiduciary duty and then offered to resolve the
dispute by selling Jonathan their shares
in the company.
During mediation, the two brothers’
counsel increased the sales price and
threatened that if Jonathan did not pay,
the brothers would accuse him of perjury
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and contempt in the pending lawsuit.
That could lead to his imprisonment, the
destruction of his reputation, his debarment from the online gaming business,
and, eventually, to claims against third
parties to whom he had transferred assets.
Jonathan, in turn, complained that his
brothers were making improper threats
in order to extort a ransom price for their
shares. The English trial and appellate
courts agreed with the lone brother, holding that the threats “exceeded what was
‘permissible in settlement of hard fought
commercial litigation.’”
The English courts found that even if
Jonathan committed the alleged crimes,
the threats against him were improper for
five reasons: (1) his brothers were threatening criminal action; (2) their threats
had “serious implications for Jonathan’s
family”; (3) they also threatened to publicize the allegations; (4) the threats were
meant to benefit the brothers, not the
company; and (5) there was no connection shown between Jonathan’s alleged
misconduct and the increased demand.
Would the threats be viewed just as unfavorably by United States courts, which
tend to be more tolerant of rough-and-tumble negotiation and trial practice?
In the United States, “prelitigation
letters airing grievances and threatening litigation if they are not resolved

are commonplace.” Revson v. Cinque &
Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 80 (2d Cir. 2000).
Litigators may threaten to assert colorable claims and comment on the reputational or other harm that may ensue. But
there are limits.
The ethics codes used to forbid lawyers
from “threaten[ing] to present criminal
charges solely to obtain an advantage in
a civil matter.” Model Code of Prof’l
Responsibility DR 7-105(A) (Am. Bar
Ass’n 1980). The rule was based on the
concept of extortion but went farther.
Lawyers could not coerce a civil remedy
by threatening criminal accusations unrelated to the civil wrong—for example,
by threatening a thief, “Return the stolen
money or we will tell the prosecutor that
you possess child pornography.”
But the rule also seemed to forbid
some threats that were non-extortionate
and reasonable—e.g., “Return the stolen
money or we will report the theft to the
prosecutor.” Given the rule’s overbreadth,
the drafters of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct decided to scrap it
and leave the problem to the law of extortion, which makes the relevant distinction. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Ops. 94-383 (1994)
& 92-363 (1992).
But even in states without the old
rule, lawyers still may not advance a civil

claim by threatening unrelated criminal allegations. That’s extortionate even
if the criminal accusation and the civil
claim are factually supported, not fabricated. Authorities will find extortionate
threats to be “prejudicial to the administration of justice” under Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(d) or “to have
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass . . . a third person” under Model
Rule 4.4(a).
And it is not only threats to instigate
criminal charges that are extortionate.
Threats to cause other harms may also be
improper if they are unconnected to the
underlying civil claim. For example, a defense lawyer who knows that the plaintiff is an undocumented immigrant may
not threaten to report the plaintiff to immigration authorities in order to extract
a settlement of a lawsuit that has nothing to do with the plaintiff’s immigration
status. N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op.
2005-3 (2005).
Litigators also risk sanction—or
worse—if there is no legitimate basis
for their threatened action. In State v.
Hynes, 978 A.2d 264 (N.H. 2009), for example, the court upheld a lawyer’s extortion conviction for baselessly threatening
to sue a beauty salon for discriminatory
pricing if it did not compensate him.
And litigators may be punished for
threatening to cause more than the ordinary embarrassment that comes with
litigation. For example, a lawyer was
recently sanctioned for trying to compel a settlement by threatening to issue
press releases and use other extrajudicial
means to embarrass the opposing party.
In re Matter of Strojnik, No. PDJ 20169083 (Ariz. Nov. 16, 2016).
The threats in the English Ferster case
probably crossed the line even by U.S.
standards. On the other hand, it is easy
to stay on the right side of the line, and
U.S. litigators don’t often cross it. They
may still threaten to bring colorable civil
lawsuits, inflicting all the pain that such
lawsuits conventionally entail. q
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